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WHO "OWNS" A CULTURAL TREASURE?
-

Jason Y. Hall*

PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT:
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES. By Joseph L. Sax. Ann Arbor:

The University of Michigan Press. 1999. Pp. xiv, 245. $32.50.
INTRODUCTION

Because of the thoughtfulness of its arguments, the range and
depth of its presentation of specific cases, and the fairness with which
it reveals, thinks through, and allows some validity to opposing points
of view, Playing Darts with a Rembrandt is a valuable contribution to
understanding which parties have, and should have, rights in key ob
jects that comprise our collective heritage. That I am not persuaded
by some of the specific arguments in the book in no way reduces my
admiration for what it accomplishes.
In the lucid, direct style that characterizes the book, Joseph L. Sax1
opens with:
This is a book about a very odd matter: Many of the greatest artifacts of
our civilization can be owned by anyone who has the money to buy them,
or the luck to find them, and their owners can then treat the objects
however their fancy or their eccentricity dictates. [p. 1]

After presenting a quick overview of the topic, he makes his own posi
tion clear:
The thesis of this book is quite straightforward. It is simply this: There
are many owned objects in which a larger community has a legitimate
stake because they embody ideas, or scientific and historic information,
of importance. For the most part it is neither practical nor appropriate
that these things be publicly owned. It is, for example, highly desirable
that private individuals collect art according to their own tastes and have
the enjoyment of it. The conjunction of legitimate private and public in
terests, however, suggest [sic] that ordinary, unqualified notions of own
ership are not satisfactory for such objects. I propose that several quali
fications are generally appropriate: a bar on destruction and on denial of
access, and at least a presumption against grants of exclusive access to
particular individuals (such as authorized biographers or favored re-
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searchers). Of course, no such general prescription can resolve the nu
merous and fascinating variant situations that arise: Must the heir of a
famous writer make her love letters public? How long should material
- admittedly of historic interest - be embargoed in library collections?
Should libraries distinguish between scholars and journalists in granting
access? Is an archaeologist who wants exclusive rights to a site different
from an authorized biographer who wants exclusive control of his sub
ject's papers? Should anyone be allowed to destroy a great artist's work?
The artist himself? The artist's heirs or executors? A patron, who is dis
pleased with a commissioned work? [pp. 9-10]

In making his

case, Sax divides his book into three parts. The first,

The Fine Arts (pp. 11-78), begins with a detailed account of the cele

brated 1930s controversy about Diego Rivera's mural, commissioned
by the Rockefeller family for the RCA building at Rockefeller Center
in New York. Sax follows with a discussion of artists' "moral rights"
and public rights, focusing on the California Art Preservation Act (pp.
21-34); the rights of portrait sitters and of the artists themselves, and
of their heirs and executors (pp. 35-47); duties in the protection of no
table architecture (pp. 48-59); and collectors and their duties to the
public (pp. 60-78). In this part, as in the following two, the book has
the great virtue of providing sufficient details of the many specific his
torical situations noted so that the reader has enough evidence not
only to see Sax's point but also potentially to reach different conclu
sions about the proper disposition of property in similar cases in the
future.
In Part Two, Paper Trails (pp. 79-150), Sax provides individual
chapters that explore the rights of access to historically significant
written materials, including discussion of the history of the treatment
of ownership of presidential papers. Further, Sax provides accounts of
the varying provisions laid down by Supreme Court justices (Black,
Brandeis, Frankfurter, Holmes, Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall) for
access to their own papers, including their judgments about degrees of
confidentiality needed to preserve the appropriate functioning of the
Court. Sax concludes this part with chapters that highlight the differ
ent access rules for library and museum collections and that elaborate
on the range of relationships between heirs, biographers, and scholars.
As illustrations of such relationships, he discusses the handling of the
letters of Warren Harding, James Joyce, and Matthew Arnold, and the
papers of Benjamin Banneker and Martin Luther King Jr., and he
considers authorized biographies and economic benefits to heirs.
The third part, Skins and Bones (pp. 151-96), tackles the scholarly
conventions in archaeology, anthropology, and papyrology for first ac
cess to ancient manuscripts and archaeological objects and sites. An
entire chapter is devoted to "An Academic Scandal Par Excellence:
The Dead Sea Scrolls" (pp. 153-64) followed by a discussion of the ra
tionale for such conventions and the argued social costs of their appli-
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cation. The part ends with a discussion of rights in archaeological
treasures, illustrated chiefly by the cases of the famous Tyrannosaurus
rex "Sue" and the wall paintings in the Chauvet Cave in southern
France.
I.

SAX'S MAIN CONTENTIONS

There. are difficulties with some of Sax's main arguments. Could
we ban destruction of cultural objects as a practical, enforceable mat
ter? Would that stop anyone who was determined? And how would
society enforce this - would the "culture police" come to your home
with a warrant periodically to check on you? Or would your envious
neighbor report that you have been burning suspicious things in your
back yard? Would you have to register the object? Post bond on it?
We do not need such a ban on destruction. How sensible would it
be to create a law banning what Sax himself concedes is the unusual
occurrence of destruction as "simply an act of proprietary caprice" (p.
16) - the very "playing darts with a Rembrandt" of the title? Indeed,
all the incentives - the high price paid for the object, the prestige of
being its owner, the rarity or uniqueness of the object, its aesthetic or
intellectual beauty, its value in enhancing one's career - are on the
side of preservation in most cases.2 And where owners wish to destroy
because they hate the message of the object, they are now deterred
more strongly than at any time in the past by the threat to their repu
tation posed by such an act. (Public disapproval of such an act is both
more intense, due to evolving attitudes about cultural objects, and
more instantaneously widespread, due to television and the Internet,
than ever before.)
Society also cannot effectively ban an owner's ability to deny ac
cess to the object. Some things are not reachable by the law. Objects
from cars to art are, and will continue to be, stolen to order by unscru
pulous buyers, and the more unique, and therefore conspicuous, the
object, the more likely the contractor of the theft will be to hide it
away entirely.3 To illustrate, a stolen Mercedes may be publicly
drivable if taken far enough away from the point of theft because
there are many legal outlets for the sale of identical cars that provide
disguise. A stolen Rembrandt, however, is unique and its individuality
is well known to many art experts worldwide; with growing telecom
munications technology, it is increasingly difficult to show such a rare
painting without ultimate detection.
2. For example, Steve Wynn, multi-millionaire owner of several Las Vegas casinos, sud
denly became much better known when he started buying the works of "name" artists for his
for-profit museum at his new casino, Bellagio.
3. The theft of a cezanne from Oxford's Ashmolean Museum on January 1 of this year
appears to be just one of the more recent in a long line of such cases. See Sarah Lyall, Art
World Nightmare: Made-to-Order Theft, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2000, at El.

1866

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:1863

Even if we did make it unlawful for an owner to deny access to
others, what would the sanctions be? Fines would likely pose no
problem for those wealthy enough to acquire the objects. And in
cases where the objects were inherited intellectual property (such as
letters) and not purchased objects, would we, as a society, be comfort
able attaching fines to heirs for trying to protect their family's reputa
tion? Jail time with murderers and rapists hardly seems appropriate
for this offense. And would the threat of "country club" jail deter?
Confiscation? Do we really want the justice system to become an ap
praiser and collector of our cultural property, and would American
museums and libraries have comfortable relations with the donors on
whom they depend for more than 80% of their collections if they be
came repositories for such confiscations?
Even if we could resolve all of these questions, who would decide
which objects are "worthy" of such protection? And how would we
turn into law the judgment questions archivists and curators face all
the time - which objects "must" be saved, and for whom (scholars,
the public, etc.)? And for how long? Most objects do not have time
less, universal value, and standards change over time.
Yet Sax is right that there is a problem here, and he is most con
vincing about its reality when he describes particular kinds of cases
and the different contexts and conventions for dealing with different
kinds of objects.
A. Sax and the Destruction of Fine Arts
In his section on the fine arts, for example, Sax uses the example of
the destruction of the Rivera mural by its patron, the Rockefeller
family, to argue that "today it seems obvious that our collective inter
est in perpetuating art should trump an owner's sensibilities" (p. 18).
He acknowledges, however, that in the case of someone who has
commissioned a work of art, "there is the added risk that the artist's
unwanted message will not only be disseminated, but will be associ
ated with the patron," and this shows "that in some instances owners
can have interests that go beyond mere proprietorship" (p. 17).
Indeed, I would argue that a patron seems a different kind of
owner, different even from other "first owners," in that s/he gives
some indication of what s/he wants for the money, while all other
kinds of owners decide to purchase on the basis of a finished product.
A patron, especially in architecture, may be as much an artistic col
laborator as a buyer. Sax effectively qualifies his own argument by
writing, "[w]e are fortunate that the statues of Stalin demolished all
over Eastern Europe in recent years were aesthetic mediocrities" (p.
17), implying that perhaps it is only the "best" art that deserves special
protections.

May 2000]

Cultural Treasure

1867

Sax, however, finds a solution to this particular problem by posit
ing that it would have been best if, as was suggested by the New York
Times,4 Rivera had been invited to take his fresco away. That is just
what would have been the remedy, Sax notes, had a current law - the
California Art Preservation Act - applied in this case. To Sax, and to
me, this seems a reasonable compromise between the rights of the pa
tron and the artist. And again, he sides with a reasonable compromise
when he discusses art in public spaces. He approves of the decision of
the city of Carlsbad, California to give a 78-month trial period to some
public space art that was very widely opposed by Carlsbad citizens,
with the citizens voting about two-to-one near the end of that period
to remove the art (pp. 29-32).
Sax's arguments are less persuasive when he discusses portraits in
the following chapter (pp. 35-47). In fairness, he takes on a particu
larly difficult case - a gift portrait of Winston Churchill. Portraits of
major historical figures are unlike portraits of the rest of us in that
they are presumed to be historical as well as aesthetic objects.
Picasso's aesthetic intentions trump our need to see a representational
view of the sitter in his portraits of his mistresses, but when we look at
a portrait of George Washington, created with the intention of re
cording a likeness of a historical figure, we expect not only aesthetic
quality but also some verisimilitude. In this case, Parliament commis
sioned Graham Sutherland, an important portraitist, to paint a portrait
of Churchill as a gift to him on his birthday. By all accounts, it was un
flattering, as it certainly appears to be in the book's illustration.
Churchill accepted it graciously but hated it. Apparently it was hidden
for a time at one of his houses and Mrs. Churchill destroyed it before
Churchill's death (p. 37).
Sax seems sure that the portrait should not have been destroyed,
citing a number of experts who thought it was "good, or very good
art" (p. 38). He does, however, mention other people who did not like
it, and notes that everyone agreed that it was unflattering (p. 37). I,
too, would have favored another course than destruction - the
Churchills could have given it back to the artist with a disclaimer indi
cating their reasons for finding it an inadequate likeness, after a token
period to show respect to Parliament. As an alternative, they could, as
Sax suggests, have held the picture and prevented it from being shown
during Churchill's lifetime or even that generation.
While I would not have favored destruction, I think Sax dismisses
the arguments for destruction by the work's subject too lightly, par
ticularly since he favors giving unlimited rights to the artist him/herself
to destroy any of his/her own works s/he chooses (pp. 42-43). A rele
vant question here is whether the object or the reputation is the key

4. P. 20 (quoting, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1934, at E4).

·
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good here. If the aesthetics of the object are paramount, what right
does even its creator have to destroy it as "unworthy?" If reputation
is paramount, does the reputation of the artist mean everything and
the reputation of the historical figure mean nothing? Sax seems to
want the reputation of the artist to trump that of all others. Is that to
society's benefit? And in the Churchill case, the portrait was a gift,
and the intention of the patron was to please the recipient. Sax is con
cerned about loss to the "historical record," the loss of "the painter's
insight on a great man to be compared with the many flattering and
still extant portraits that presumably satisfied Sir Winston's ego" (p.
40), but was the portrait insightful? Was this portrait necessarily
insightful because Churchill hated it, and other renditions falsely "flat
tering" just because he, as the subject, did not object?
B.

Architecture

To my knowledge, architectural creations are the only art objects
that are inhabited as well as admired, expected to look good but also
not leak. There are exceptions to this in architecture, such as purely
ceremonial works like the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. But even
there, the art object has a defined social purpose - an agreed-upon
function - that must be accommodated along with the architect's and
client's aesthetic desires. Architecture is thus an art form with conti
nuity back to earlier times, when most if not all art forms - paintings,
masks, poetry, plays, dance, song - had social (often religious) as well
as aesthetic functions, as they still do in many tribal societies.5
Since that is the case, in this art form, there continues to be the as
sumption that there will be a negotiation between architect and client
from which the object emerges. In addition, architecture is the only
art form, except perhaps for sculpture, that encloses instead of being
enclosed; thus it is inherently "in the face" of the public. As a result,
there is also a tradition of, and more allowance for, public constraints
on its creation for reasons of safety and space usage as well as aes
thetics.
Sax is well aware that buildings "are almost always employed as
part of everyday life" (p. 48) and, for the reasons noted above, he is on
more solid ground in this area than in some others when he argues for
social intervention in at least some architectural decisions. In dis
cussing cases of modification of aesthetically significant buildings including that of the Salk Institute, and the Guggenheim, Whitney and
Kimball museums - he suggests various options for exerting public
control, including a permitting process or allowing construction to
proceed after a period unless the city takes action. He argues -

5. See 1 ARNOLD HAUSER, THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF ART l-55ff (1951).
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rightly, I think - that in these cases, "[w]hatever the ultimate choice
about a regulatory regime, some arrangement that permits the profes
sional and affected public communities to be heard, and to convey to
proprietors the importance to the community of the work they own,
seems appropriate" (p. 53).

C. Private Collectors and Surrounding Concerns
In discussing private collectors, Sax concisely makes the case for
the social value of private collecting: "[A] primary value of the collec
tor is the very presence of individual and eccentric, often advanced,
tastes that would never be reflected in (indeed is [sic] all too often re
jected by) official canons of selection and propriety" (p. 60). While
acknowledging the many petty motives that may influence collectors,
he nonetheless strongly, and I think rightly, defends such resulting
collections' public value. He is concerned, however, about restriction
of access, so much so that while " [v]oluntary arrangements for access
are, of course, preferable . . . . Where no such incentives suffice, con
sideration should be given to a system of obligatory, expense
compensated loans to public institutions" (p. 66). He also quickly and
fairly notes that this idea has "had vociferous critics who claimed that
any such responsibilities would unduly discourage collectors" (p. 66).
I think the critics are exactly on target here. I can hardly think of any
thing that would more quickly encourage collectors to buy anony
mously and otherwise seek to conceal their ownership. Sax goes on to
lay out a proposed regime for such forced loans, with sweeteners for
the "donors" including no expenses to be borne by the owner, a panel
of experts to decide which objects are to be subject to forced loans, no
more than one loan in a given period, and use of such forced loans
only as a last resort. But that ignores many practical difficulties. How
would the "experts" pick one museum over another as the proper
place to display such a temporarily confiscated object? And what mu
seum would seek the "benefits" of such a forced loan? None would
likely request such forcing, and none would agree to be the destina
tion, since to do so would be to dry up virtually all voluntary loans
and, more importantly, all gifts of objects to that museum from that
point forward.
And listing this as a "last resort" does not reduce the problems.
What kind of a friendly conversation could a collector have with a mu
seum about a voluntary loan when s/he knows that if the museum does
not like a potentially willing lender's terms for the loan, or an unwill
ing owner's resistance to parting with the object at a given time, for a
given period, to that particular museum, the museum can ultimately
force a loan?
In addition, what about cases where the objects' fragility would put
them at physical threat in a forced loan? There are also reasonable
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concerns about an unsuitable venue - inadequate security, climate
control, etc. That is why museums typically have careful rules about
the conditions that must be met by the receiving institution before
they will agree to loan.
Even if we could resolve all of the above problems, there is an ad
ditional question to consider: Doesn't the possibility of such compul
sion make us as queasy as the idea of sealing things up in a vault?
Finally, such compulsion would run counter to one of the core ac
tivities that make American museums possible at all. American mu
seums could not operate without a huge amount of volunteer support.
Many have more volunteers than paid staff, and those volunteers often
provide very basic services, from cleaning the floors to staffing the
boards that direct the museum's future. American museums also get
more than 80% of their collections from gifts, and very many exhibits
have at least one privately owned loaned object on display. That is
why museums would likely be in the forefront of those who would op
pose such forced loans.
As Sax continues his discussion, he cites many collectors through
out history who viewed their collecting as stewardship for a larger
public. He concludes that the "stewardship tradition is obviously
powerful and deeply rooted, and impressively it grows out of self
imposed restraint, not as a duty imposed by law or even the strictures
of public opinion. Should we leave it at that?" (p. 72). Using as his
example the unusual and arbitrary access rules of Dr. Albert Barnes to
his famous Barnes Collection in Philadelphia, Sax holds that we
should not leave it at that. The irony here is that, as Sax notes, the
collection did ultimately become open to the public, and even under
Dr. Barnes' arbitrary rules, many people did get the opportunity to
view the collection. Should we seek compulsion to deal with only a
few cases, especially when we know that even in those cases, public
access is ultimately achieved?
D. Documentary Evidence
In Paper Trails, his second part, Sax examines documentary evi
dence. As with fine arts, he notes his preference for voluntary access
rather than legislative mandates (p. 90), but his frustration with less
than perfect access is again evident in his discussion of changing
American views on who has rights over Presidential papers. His dis
cussion of different Supreme Court justices' decisions regarding how
their own papers should be handled is particularly nuanced, as he rec
ognizes and sympathizes with restrictions on access in cases where
contemporaries are alive and "privacy concerns are at their greatest"
(p. 109). He notes, however, the costs of delays in making important
information available, and thus reasonably suggests an embargo of
some material "from everyone for an appropriate period, and open all
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the rest," so that not just an approved biographer has access to all (p.
109). But should the law mandate access to everyone?
As he discusses access to library and museum collections, he
rightly observes that it is the standard policy of most museums and li
braries to make objects as accessible as possible, consistent with pru
dent attention to their protection (p. 118). He goes on to note, how
ever, that both libraries and museums may have restrictions on access
to certain collections, including limitations imposed by donors. He
calls for "uniform standards, institutional commitment to enforce
ment, and reasonable periods of time, with reasonableness tied in
some way to the span of lifetimes contemporary with the events and
documents in question" (p. 128). This seems a fair and reasonable
goal, although a difficult one to attain in practice, for several reasons.
First of all, museums and libraries are in the business of both ac
quiring and making publicly accessible the material remains of our cul
tural and natural heritage. The collecting is not an end in itself but a
means to increase public understanding. Therefore, accessibility for
that purpose is the ultimate goal. But if a uniform requirement of ac
cessibility within X years causes a donor of papers or other artifacts to
decide to keep or destroy those materials, then the collecting that
feeds the accessibility is undermined. Museum and libraries thus may
need to retain some flexibility in their rules on when they will make
materials accessible in order for any institution to convince prospec
tive donors to part with the materials in the first place.
Secondly, both the museum and the library communities have
many different subdivisions with necessarily different rules and tradi
tions. For example, natural science museums are not like art museums
in many respects, and research libraries are not necessarily like public
libraries. Thus, even if it were advisable to have uniform rules in this
area, it might well be impossible to create them.
Sax is a little less fair when dealing with family papers of cele
brated individuals which are now held by heirs. While acknowledging
generally that privacy is a "legitimate concern," (p. 134), he is quick to
assert the "public's right to know" about virtually every detail of such
a figure's private life. I, however, do not think we yet have a social
consensus on how much of people's lives - even those of celebrities
- is public property. Indeed, our interest in gossip about the famous
is not an innocent pleasure for most of us - it is a somewhat guilty
one, for we know that we would not want our own lives so publicly ex
posed. We find ways to tell ourselves that there are justifiable reasons
for us to know, including that the celebrities knew that such greater
exposure was a price of their celebrity, but are we completely easy
about this? And do the heirs have no rights in this matter? To his
credit, Sax cites one of them:
[A] person's interest in his good name does not die with him. On the
contrary, along with his name it is passed on to his descendents. The

1872

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:1863

provision I find most short-sighted is that which protects only living per
sons from the publication of papers which might be used to embarrass,
damage, injure or harass them. 6

This is not to say that I would differ with Sax on the general principle
that destruction of such papers may well do damage to the historical
record. I am simply inclined to give more weight to questions of rights
of privacy, and thus the length of time that access might be restricted,
than I think he is.
E. Artifacts and Archaeology
Perhaps his most fascinating part is his last, Skins and Bones,
where he deals with access to ancient manuscripts, fossils, and ar
chaeological sites. After his recounting of the story of unreasonable
lack of access to the Dead Sea Scrolls, there can be little doubt that
this was just what he has entitled it: "An Academic Scandal Par Ex
cellence." But the story leads him to a sympathetic discussion of
"publication rights," a consensus on certain kinds of restriction of ac
cess to materials that is apparently common in archaeology, anthro
pology, and papyrology. As he does in many other places in this book,
Sax, to his great credit, attempts to understand and confront the logic
behind such restrictions even when they oppose his main thesis of
maximum access. Here he notes that in these disciplines, there do ap
pear to be some special circumstances that might justify some restric
tions, such as providing an incentive to discover a site or manuscript
material, physical difficulties in sharing the site or fragile materials,
and the need for certain kinds of time-consuming preliminary recon
structive work that only needs to be done once (pp. 172-73). With
these and the other circumstances he notes in mind, he concludes that
in such cases, "a brief period of exclusivity may be the best practical
solution" (p. 174).
In his concluding discussion of antiquities, where he focuses on the
discovery of the Tyrannosaurus Rex "Sue" and the ancient wall
paintings in the Chauvet Cave, he suggests American application of a
suggestion by an English expert, in which the
finder (or landowner) would have good title, but that title could only be
secured by reporting the find, and lodging the item (or, in the appropri
ate case, securing a site), for a specified period, with a designated
authority such as a regional museum . . . . The object would then either
be returned to the finder with a certificate of good title . . . or it would be
acquired, and compensation paid. [p. 179]

6. P. 140 (emphasis in original). Here, Sax is quoting Regina C. McGranery in ACCESS
TO THE PAPERS OF RECENT PUBLIC FIGURES: THE NEW HARMONY CONFERENCE 55
(Alonzo L. Hamby & Edward Weldon eds., 1977).
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While the criminal sanctions in the proposal seem unworkable to
me, and there would be many practical difficulties in the application of
such a procedure (getting the political will for the legislation in the
first place, museums being overwhelmed by requests to store objects,
getting reliable assessments of value, costs of all of the above, etc.),
this is an idea worth more thought. We have not had much success in
the past ten years in resolving the genuine and growing problem of
looting of fossils on Federal lands, not to mention haphazard and de
contextualized withdrawal of fossils (for which there is a growing
commercial market) from privately-owned lands. Sax's discussion of
the Antiquities Act of 1906'7 and the Archaeological Protection Re
sources Act (ARPA),8 as well as comparable laws in other countries,
provides very helpful background information here. He rightly notes
that the limitation of the protections in both the Antiquities Act and
ARPA to human-made artifacts, and then only ones on Federal or
Indian lands, leaves large loopholes. At the same time, there has been
a long history of cooperation and even crossover between amateurs
interested in fossil collecting and professional paleontologists. In ad
dition, it has been argued that where fossil remains are exposed on the
earth's surface, it may sometimes make more sense for properly
trained amateurs to excavate them if the alternative is for the fossils to
deteriorate from weather exposure. Thus, given the current situation
of active amateur collecting and gaps in legal protections, some natu
ral history museums (chiefly in regions such as the mountain West
where there are many fossils) have provided formal training in paleon
tology to interested amateurs and have developed close cooperation
between those trained and the museum's professional paleontologists.

II.

OBSERVATIONS AND POSSIBLE SUGGESTIONS

Overall, Sax makes a strong case that there is an access problem
with at least some privately-owned cultural treasures, a weaker case
about the need for protection from unintended damage, and almost no
case that there is much actual "playing darts with a Rembrandt."9 Sax
again and again seems inclined to try voluntary solutions first but is
also willing to rapidly move to compulsory schemes if perfect access is
not achieved. I think we should spend more time thinking about addi
tional voluntary solutions at this point and less on speculating about
compulsory ones. One possibility that comes to mind is to build on
the long tradition of stewardship among collectors that Sax documents
(pp. 60-78). What might be useful here would be to translate that

7. 16 u.s.c. § 433 (1994).
8. 16 U.S.C. § 470(e) (1994).
9. That is, capricious as opposed to reasoned destruction (as in the special case of heirs
destroying damaging family love letters).
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vague ethos into a code of ethics for collectors, paralleling those cre
ated by museum professionals, attorneys, doctors and other profes
sionals.10 Such a collectors' code might come from existing groups that
already contain large numbers of collectors who donate to museums
or other cultural institutions, such as The Museum Trustees Associa
tion, or from existing organizations of collectors in specific areas, such
as the International Book Collectors Association, the National Asso
ciation of Watch and Clock Collectors, and the American Numismatic
Association. Perhaps a new association of collectors, consisting of in
dividuals who collect across many fields, could arise, providing a place
where collectors might learn from each other and subscribe to the
same ethical code. To be shunned by an important reference group is
no small thing, and if there were clearer ethical standards for collec
tors, the untarnished recognition of their status and their taste by their
peer collectors might be an additional incentive for responsible be
havior.
There is another growing reason why we may want to be a bit hesi
tant to reach for compulsory approaches before we have exhausted
voluntary means. America is currently the preeminent nation in the
use of the Internet and is likely to stay that way for some time. I think
that it is no accident that Americans also have a growing consensus of
concern about invasions of privacy increasingly made possible by the
new communications technologies. As marketers, private detectives,
computer hackers and others gain more and more surreptitious access
to the details of our private lives, are we not at least a little more con
cerned to maintain private areas in our lives? As we become more
conscious of how journalistic and scholarly reputations are made, in
cluding through attacks on "conventional" authority - political fig
ures, historical figures, scientific and artistic figures, and fellow schol
ars and journalists - by any accessible means, are we not more
skeptical than our parents were about absolute standards like "the
public's right to know?" Are we not more inclined to ask first what
public purpose (not including our natural interest in gossip) is served
and how that public purpose should be balanced against this right of
everyone, including celebrities, to a bit of uninvaded life?
CONCLUSION
Although I disagree with Professor Sax on several key points, I
recommend Playing Darts with a Rembrandt highly to anyone who has

10. For example, the American Association of Museums' Code of Ethics for Museums
has had a demonstrably powerful impact on both the substance of the code of ethics of par
ticular museums and on the practices within U.S. museums generally. See AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF MUSEUMS, CODE OF ETHICS FOR MUSEUMS (2000), the most recent edi
tion of the Code.
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an interest in the handling of important cultural treasures. It is clearly
written, full of information about key instances and relevant laws, and
sensitive to unique considerations with different kinds of cultural
treasures. It provides not a single approach but many possible ap
proaches to the multitude of problems it describes. Finally, it has a
tone of modesty, making no claims of providing a final answer to the
array of provocative questions it raises and explores so well.

